Out & About with Brief Year-End #RandomThoughts

 2025 is beginning--and it will be quite a year.   I decided to share some year-end #RandomThoughts-Onward to 2025 with all its' possibilities:

Out & About with Mid-Month #RandomThoughts

As the holidays are before us, I wanted to begin by sharing some #RandomThoughts on Iran and some perspective I ran across on the Elections as a new Adminstration take shape: 

 Here is the entire text of a column written for Clarín, the largest newspaper in Argentina and moreover one that has the second largest circulation in the Spanish-speaking world, by my friend David Rieff, son of Susan Sontag, that dares to speak unpalatable truths. I urge you to read it:

“That there was no room in the imagination of American liberalism for a Trump victory, let alone for one as lopsided as that victory proved to be, tells one a great deal about just how hermetic, self-referential, and smug American liberalism has become. It is true that most of Kamala Harris’ supporters were somewhat anxious, most expecting the election to be close. But what they did not expect was that Trump would score the most impressive victory achieved by a Republican presidential candidate since George H. W. Bush defeated Michael Dukakis in 1988, in that not only did he win decisively in the electoral college – the US does not have direct elections but rather electors in each state pledged to the winning candidate there – but, unlike in his victory over Hillary Clinton in 2016, when he lost the popular vote, this time Trump got close to five million more votes than Kamala Harris. And yet during the campaign, while obviously not terribly enfeebled as Joe Biden sadly proved to be, Trump displayed only a fraction of the sheer energy that marked his successful run against Clinton and his loss to Biden. For Democrats, once Biden was eased out, it seemed impossible that Harris could actually lose.

“Unsurprisingly, now that Trump has won, Democrats are having tremendous difficulty in coming to terms with what has just happened. From talk shows on Democratic-leaning cable television networks such as CNN and MSNBC where the talking heads outdo each other looking for someone to blame, to countless Tik Tok videos posted online by young people recording them literally screaming and raging, to universities announcing that there will be places for students traumatized by the result to go for counseling or just to try to come to with what just happened, liberal and ‘progressive’ America are in full meltdown.

“And yet given the economic and social conditions in the country, what would have been surprising was had Harris won. Exit polls taken on election day showed that 45% of voters said their economic situation had grown worse during the Biden-Harris administration – the highest figure this century, higher even than that recorded in the 2008, during the so-called Great Recession. At the same time, voters’ views of the direction the United States was going in were even more negative, with 72% of the voters declaring themselves dissatisfied or angry and only 26% enthusiastic or at least satisfied. As for President Biden, by the time of the election, his approval ratings had sunk to around 40%. As Biden’s vice-president, Harris could not escape her share of the blame, and the one criticism of her campaign that one did hear often from her supporters in the run up to the election was that Harris could not or would not repudiate Biden’s record, for to do so would mean in a sense repudiating herself, but also did not seem able to describe, even without breaking with the president, how if elected she would do things differently.

“But in reality Harris’ problem was structural and ideological rather than situational, reflecting the deep contradictions within the Democratic Party. Like many social democratic parties in Europe, in the past thirty years the Democrats in the US have gone from being the party of the working class to being the party of the professional managerial classes. This was born out in the election: the one demographic Harris carried easily was that of people making more than 100,000 dollars a year. And it is not as if the Democrats themselves were oblivious to the shift. To the contrary, since at least 2016, leading members of the party had viewed this as a strength rather than as a weakness. As the leader of the Democratic Party in the Senate, Charles Schumer, told an interviewer during the 2016 campaign, “For every blue-collar Democrat we lose in western Pennsylvania, we will pick up two moderate Republicans in the suburbs in Philadelphia, and you can repeat that in Ohio and Illinois and Wisconsin.” Of course, one might have thought that the fact that Trump won in 2016 would have caused the Democrats to alter this view. But their interpretation of Trump’s victory was that it had been an anomaly, and that Biden’s defeat of Trump, not to mention Trump’s own lunatic behavior in the aftermath of his loss, and his myriad legal troubles, meant that there was no compelling reason for the Democrats to alter their strategy, let alone worry about what their party actually stood for.

“Except in very rare cases, elections in most countries are decided on the basis of the economy. The problem for the Democrats is that neoliberalism makes it impossible to speak of a single economy based on GNP. To the contrary, in neoliberal economies, GNP can be very positive, and the high-earning, stock owning part of the population may be doing very well as a result, while at the same time the lower middle and working classes are doing very badly. This is certainly the case in the United States, where real (that is, inflation adjusted) wages for working class people have not gone up in decades. Add to that rising inflation rates in the past two years in the US, and you have a situation where there are, in effect, two Americas. The problem for the Democrats was that over this period their core constituency had become this America that was doing well, not the America of low wage earners who had been the base of the party for most of the second half of the past century.

“This put Harris in the position of being unable even to address the economic malaise in the US since this would alienate the party’s new base and not play well with the suburban Republican swing voters it sought to attract.

“Of course, this left the road open for Donald Trump to appeal precisely to working class voters, and for the Republicans and Democrats to in effect trade places in terms of their most loyal supporters, just as, in France, Marine Le Pen’s Rassemblement National is now the leading party of the native-born French working class. Trump’s message to the voters was, in effect, “The Democrats dismiss your fears, but in reality you are right to be angry and frightened, and I am going to fix all that.” And either the Democrats had no answer to that message, or else they did not understand its power. Instead, the Harris campaign’s strategy for victory was largely based on the assumption that the fear Trump would further curtail abortion rights would mobilize large numbers of women to come out and vote for her. For his part, Trump seems to have recognized this and during the campaign, much to the discomfiture of his many die hard anti-abortion rights supporters, he moderated his position. Still, in the last weeks before the election it seemed as if the decisive factor was not going to be race --- this despite the fact that Trump did have the backing of many people who can legitimately be called white nationalists --- but rather gender.

“But again, this was more complicated than it seemed because issues of gender are not just issues of rights but issues of culture, and the US has been convulsed over the past twenty years by the culture wars pitting Woke and anti-Woke worldviews against each other. Here, too, however, it is impossible to separate the culture war from the class war. Woke and neoliberalism have been proven to be a perfectly comfortable fit, and as a result Woke has in effect become the cultural ideology of the professional managerial classes, that is, again, of the Democratic Party’s new core constituency. And under the Biden administration, Trans rights and the rest of the panoply of identitarian movements that have captured the collective imagination of and now dominate the Academic-Cultural-Philanthropic Complex in the United States got tremendous support from the Biden-Harris administration, even to the point of grotesquerie, such as the elimination of terms like maternity wards as not being ‘trans inclusive’ and so were renamed in a sizeable proportion of American hospitals and in the language of the health bureaucracy “birthing wards,” or calling Hispanic Americans ‘Latinx’. Harris did not emphasize this during the campaign, but she could not repudiate it either. At the same time, the power of the identitarian left within the Democratic Party, at least as long as that left challenged White Supremacy or patriarchy but left capitalism alone – a deal the identitarians, apart from a few campus radicals, have been more than willing to accept – has now become so great that Harris could not repudiate it anymore than she could repudiate the Biden Administration’s economic record.

“But in doing so, Harris further alienated not only white, heterosexual men, who have been the principal targets of the identitarians, but also working class American men of all races. Of course, some Harris supporters understood this. As one well-known African American Democrat put it soberly during the campaign, “If you do nothing but tell white males and heterosexual males in the Party how terrible they are, don’t be surprised when they leave.” But at Harris campaign headquarters, at least, no one seems to have been listening. But the Trump campaign was listening. Unlike the Democrats, they understood how many working class and lower middle class people of all races detested Woke. The salience of cultural questions is always difficult to quantify, of course. And there is no doubt that the principal reason for Trump’s victory was the economy. But the cultural element – one that transcends race - should not be discounted. For under Obama and then Biden, the administrative state becomes so much more radical culturally than the majority of the population. And it has not hesitated to use the full force of the law to impose its vision, including the incorporation of anyone declaring themselves to be a woman, whether or not they have ‘transitioned’, into women’s sports. Outside the professional managerial classes, this has been tremendously unpopular, and at least part of what Trump’s victory signifies is a sweeping revolt against the cultural elite represented by Harris and by the new Democratic Party in general.

“In doing so, Trump has accomplished something that had previously seemed impossible: he has created a genuinely multi-racial right. He has also in a certain sense ‘gendered’ the US two-party system with the Republican Party now being the party of men and the Democratic Party that of women (the fusion of these two elements can be seen in Trump’s winning a majority of the male Hispanic vote). The problem for Harris in the election was that reproductive rights did not have the mobilizing effect that her campaign had anticipated. To the contrary, Joe Biden actually got a slightly larger percentage of the female vote in 2020 (57%) than Harris did in 2024 (54%). In contrast, Trump’s male supporters came out to vote in record numbers. What this means for a Trump presidency, however, is a separate question. He will come into office next January with an authentic popular mandate. And his harsh policies towards illegal immigrants are likely to be popular, at least initially, among those who voted him into office, many of whom are legal immigrants. And dismantling the more egregious manifestations of Woke overreach are also likely to be popular. But as Bill Clinton’s campaign guru, James Carville, always liked to say: “It’s the economy, stupid.” And it is what Trump succeeds or fails to do with the economy that will ultimately determine his own future and the future of a Republican Party that over the past decade he has largely remade in his own image.”

David Rieff is the author of numerous books, including “Los Angeles: Capital of the Third World.”

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This was on Iran and the horrors of the past 45 years courtesy Darius Kamali on the feedback Aritifical Intelligence noted: 

Darius A. Kamali

Admin

All-star contributor

  · eonsotdSrpr4a 373c0u93t3afhg5f14ht2oubf93uh5afh68ae5675uOaff  · 

I asked various AI's (Artificial Intelligence Engines) to do a deep analysis of how much wealth Iran has lost as a result of war, sanctions, mismanagement, corruption, poor governance, brain drain, opportunity cost and environmental destruction since the 1979 Islamic revolution.

It's answer after deep analyses?

Between 10-15 Trillion Dollars !!!!!!!

(keep in mind that Iran's entire GDP last year was only $368 Billion)

Here's AI's breakdown:

Iran's Economic, Environmental, and Opportunity Losses Since the 1979 Revolution

Since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran has faced significant economic and environmental challenges that have drastically limited its potential for growth and development. The country has experienced a combination of war, sanctions, economic mismanagement, environmental degradation, and brain drain, resulting in lost revenue, opportunity costs, and long-term economic damage. These impacts, when compounded over more than four decades, amount to a staggering loss that is likely to exceed $10 trillion.

1. Oil Revenue Losses

Oil has historically been the cornerstone of Iran’s economy, accounting for a significant portion of its revenue. Before 1979, Iran was one of the world’s largest oil exporters, with an output of around 5-6 million barrels per day (bpd). However, political instability, sanctions, and war have consistently reduced Iran's oil output and export capacity since the revolution.

Pre-Revolution (1970s): Iran’s annual oil revenues exceeded $20 billion in 1976 (equivalent to approximately $150 billion today, adjusted for inflation). Oil was central to the government’s spending on infrastructure, education, and industrial development.
Post-Revolution: The revolution led to a dramatic drop in oil production, particularly during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988). This war alone caused a loss of more than 40% in oil production capacity. Following the war, international sanctions, particularly from the U.S. and E.U., further crippled Iran’s oil sector. During the harshest sanctions periods, particularly 2011-2015 and 2018-2021, Iran’s oil exports fell from 2.5 million bpd to less than 400,000 bpd.
Total Oil Revenue Loss: Cumulative oil revenue losses since 1979 are estimated to be between $1-2 trillion or more, factoring in the sharp reduction in oil production and exports during times of war and sanctions. These figures consider the gap between actual revenues and what Iran could have earned had it maintained a stable production and export level.

2. Economic Sanctions and Lost Trade Opportunities

The most significant economic impact on Iran has been the decades of international sanctions imposed over its nuclear program, support for terrorism, and regional conflicts. These sanctions have targeted key sectors, including oil, banking, and industry, greatly restricting Iran's access to global financial markets, trade, and investment.

Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Loss: Sanctions have deterred foreign investment, especially in the oil and gas sectors, which are crucial for Iran’s economic development. The country’s potential to attract foreign investment and develop industries has been severely undercut, leading to an estimated $100 billion in lost foreign investment.
Currency Devaluation: Sanctions, economic mismanagement, and inflation have caused Iran’s currency, the rial, to lose more than 90% of its value since 1979. This severe devaluation has led to hyperinflation, reduced purchasing power, and the erosion of household wealth.
Trade Losses: Iran’s exclusion from international trade networks, including the World Trade Organization (WTO), has led to missed opportunities for economic integration. Trade embargoes have cost the Iranian economy hundreds of billions in lost potential trade and market expansion. In sectors such as oil, gas, technology, and manufacturing, sanctions have stifled growth and modernization.Total Sanction-Related Opportunity Costs: Estimates place Iran's cumulative opportunity costs from sanctions and lost trade between $500 billion to $1 trillion since 1979.

3. Opportunity Costs from Conflict: The Iran-Iraq War

The Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) devastated Iran’s economy, infrastructure, and human capital. It was one of the longest and most destructive conflicts of the 20th century, with severe consequences for Iran’s economic future.

Direct Costs: The war cost Iran an estimated $500 billion to $1 trillion in military spending, infrastructure damage, and loss of oil revenue. The destruction of cities, oil refineries, and transportation networks necessitated massive post-war reconstruction, further straining the economy.
Human Capital Loss: The war led to the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Iranians, with millions more wounded or displaced. This reduced Iran’s workforce and diminished productivity in critical sectors. Moreover, the psychological impact of the war stifled economic optimism and investment.

4. Environmental Degradation and Its Economic Impact

Iran faces an environmental crisis that has added to its economic woes, particularly due to poor water management, deforestation, pollution, and the effects of climate change.

Water Crisis: Over-extraction of groundwater, mismanagement of rivers, and droughts have led to severe water shortages. Lakes like Lake Urmia have nearly dried up, and many agricultural areas have become unproductive due to desertification. This has resulted in billions of dollars in lost agricultural productivity and contributed to forced migration from rural areas.
Air Pollution: Iran’s major cities, particularly Tehran, suffer from some of the worst air pollution globally, leading to tens of thousands of premature deaths each year. The health costs associated with air pollution, including respiratory diseases and reduced labor productivity, amount to billions annually.
Deforestation and Desertification: Soil erosion, desertification, and deforestation have reduced Iran’s ability to support agriculture and sustainable development. These issues, combined with climate change, threaten long-term economic stability and have cost tens of billions of dollars in lost land productivity.Environmental and Health Costs: Environmental degradation, including the water crisis, air pollution, and desertification, has likely cost Iran $500 billion to $1 trillion over the past four decades.

5. Brain Drain and Loss of Human Capital

Since 1979, Iran has experienced one of the largest brain drains in the world. Millions of highly educated Iranians have emigrated to countries in Europe, North America, and beyond, seeking better opportunities due to political repression, economic hardship, and lack of opportunities.

Economic Impact: The emigration of millions of professionals, including scientists, engineers, doctors, and entrepreneurs, represents a significant loss of human capital. The opportunity costs from lost talent and innovation are enormous. If these skilled professionals had stayed in Iran, they could have contributed to greater economic productivity, entrepreneurship, and technological advancements.Total Cost of Brain Drain: Some estimates suggest that the brain drain has cost Iran $50 billion to $100 billion in terms of lost potential productivity and innovation.

6. Missed Opportunities for Industrialization and Modernization

Iran has vast potential for economic diversification, particularly in sectors such as technology, manufacturing, and renewable energy. However, due to political instability, sanctions, and economic mismanagement, Iran has failed to follow the industrialization trajectory of countries like South Korea, which had a comparable economy in the 1970s but is now four times larger.

Lost Industrial Growth: Countries like South Korea and Turkey capitalized on technological development and global trade integration to grow their economies significantly since the 1980s. Had Iran pursued a similar path, its GDP could have been 10 to 15 times larger today. The cumulative opportunity cost from missed industrialization and technological growth could total $5-10 trillion.
Missed Renewable Energy Development: Iran has tremendous potential for developing solar and wind power due to its geography and climate. However, its reliance on oil and gas has delayed investment in renewable energy, costing it long-term growth in this vital sector.

Total Estimated Losses (1979–Present)

When all these factors are combined—oil revenue losses, sanctions, war costs, environmental degradation, brain drain, and missed opportunities for industrialization—the total economic and opportunity cost to Iran since 1979 could easily exceed $10 trillion. This estimate includes:

Oil Revenue Losses: $1-2 trillion
Sanctions and Trade Isolation: $500 billion to $1 trillion
Iran-Iraq War Costs: $500 billion to $1 trillion
Environmental and Health Costs: $500 billion to $1 trillion
Brain Drain: $50-100 billion
Missed GDP Growth and Industrialization: Several trillion dollars

Based on the detailed breakdown of factors contributing to Iran's economic, environmental, and opportunity losses since the 1979 revolution, the total estimated losses are as follows:

Estimated Breakdown:

Oil Revenue Losses: $1-2 trillion
Sanctions and Trade Isolation: $500 billion to $1 trillion
Iran-Iraq War Costs: $500 billion to $1 trillion
Environmental and Health Costs: $500 billion to $1 trillion
Brain Drain: $50 billion to $100 billion
Missed GDP Growth and Industrialization: Several trillion dollars (estimated at $5-10 trillion, given the compounded effects of missed industrialization and economic modernization)

Total Estimated Losses:

The total estimated losses since 1979 could exceed $10 trillion to $15 trillion or even more, depending on how one factors in long-term opportunity costs from lost economic growth, technological development, and global trade integration.

This figure encompasses not only the direct economic impacts of war and sanctions but also the broader environmental degradation, brain drain, and the immense opportunity costs Iran has incurred over the last four decades.Illustration of Economic Losses.

Conclusion: A Staggering Toll

Iran’s losses since the 1979 revolution are not just economic